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Abstract
The theory of money assumes decentralized bilateral exchange and excludes centralized
multilateral exchange. However, endogenizing the exchange process is critical for understanding the conditions that support the use of money. We develop a “travelling game”
to study the spontaneous emergence of decentralized and centralized exchange, theoretically and experimentally. Players located on separate “islands” can either trade locally,
or pay a cost to trade elsewhere, so decentralized and centralized markets can both
emerge in equilibrium. The latter maximize trade meetings and are socially efficient;
the former minimize trade costs through the use of money. In the laboratory, centralized
exchange more frequently emerges when subjects perform diversified economic tasks, but
also when they interact in large groups. This shows that to understand the emergence
of money it is important to amend the theory of money such that the market structure
is endogenized.
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Introduction

In its most basic form, a model economy is a collection of individuals who exchange
the fruit of their specialized labor for something they desire but cannot produce.
Consequently, welfare individual and aggregate

hinges on the organization of

trade. In much of economic theory, trade is assumed to occur in a centralized market characterized by simultaneous multilateral exchange. Yet a sizeable literature,
mostly devoted to the study of money and trade frictions, assumes instead that
agents trade in a decentralized market characterized by asynchronous bilateral exchanges (Diamond, 1984; Duffie et al., 2005; Lucas, 1984; Kiyotaki and Wright,
1989; Townsend, 1980).1
Here we ask: How would individuals choose to organize the process of exchange? This question is important because the organization of trade has implications for allocations and the kind of assets that end up being traded. In particular,
we are interested in money. Monetary theorists justify the existence of money in
a society as a response to the trade frictions due to decentralized exchange. But
the theory of money typically ignores the fact that the mode of market interaction
arises endogenously, and simply assumes a decentralized exchange process as a
way to capture trade frictions stemming from economic specialization. However,
endogenizing the organization of trade is critical for understanding the conditions
that lend themselves to the development of money as a mode of exchange. For
example, would not specialized individuals want to better organize their exchanges
instead of trading pairwise, using money? Theoretical analyses have shown that if
agents are free to choose the structure of their market interaction, then equilibria
based on decentralized bilateral trade and centralized multilateral trade generally
coexist. Decentralized markets are more likely to emerge compared to a centralized marketplace when some object exists that is suitable to serve as a medium
1

The expressions adopted are in line with a long tradition in monetary theory going back to at
least Lucas (1984) and Hellwig (1993). “Decentralized market” is typically used to describe an
environment in which spatially separated economic agents must travel to a specific location in
order to trade asynchronously and in isolation from other economic agents. The contrasting
model of exchange is a “centralized market,” which is when all agents meet in a specific location
and trade simultaneously.
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of exchange and when multilateral trade is sufficiently costly (see Camera, 2000;
Goldberg, 2007). In this paper we present an experiment designed to provide
empirical validation for these theoretical intuitions.
In the experiment, three subjects located on separate “islands” face a trading
task that spans multiple rounds of play (a supergame). Subjects are specialized
in consumption and in production. Each individual is endowed with one of three
differentiated goods in such a manner that everyone derives a benefit from obtaining someone else’s good. Hence, there are gains from trade. Due to spatial
separation, trade requires coordination on where and when to meet counterparts.
In each round, subjects are free to travel round-trip to any one island, sustaining a transportation cost that differs across goods. The problem facing subjects
is how to coordinate on a mutually agreeable pattern of exchange in order to
maximize their net benefits in the long run. This problem is complicated by the
fact that travel choices are made independently, simultaneously and without prior
communication.
In this design the basic tradeoff faced by a subject is that his payoff rises with
the frequency of consumption but falls with the frequency of travel, the latter particularly if he carries high transportation-cost goods. Economic theory indicates
that two basic market structures can emerge in a stationary Markov equilibrium:
a decentralized market in which trades are asynchronous and bilateral, and a centralized market in which all trades are simultaneous and multilateral (see Lucas,
1984). In the former, subjects take turns travelling to different islands in order
to buy their consumption good while carrying the low transportation-cost good,
which thereby serves an explicit medium of exchange function. In the latter, all
subjects routinely meet on the same island where endowments are optimally reallocated according to consumption preferences. By design, decentralized trade
is less efficient than centralized trade, but the equilibria are Pareto incomparable
due to participants’ specialization in consumption and production.
We adopt a factorial design. In a baseline condition the environment is composed of a small, stable group: participants are specialized in consumption and
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production because their consumption good and production good are fixed for the
entire session, and they also interact for the duration of the session in a fixed group
composed of only three trade partners. In subsequent treatments we manipulate
specialization, group stability and group size. In the Rotating treatment participants’ consumption and production goods alternate across supergames so that
everyone experiences each specialization type. In the Rematching treatment
groups are randomly re-formed at the start of each supergame, so participants
cannot establish long-term relationships during the course of the session. Finally,
in the Large treatment groups are considerably larger, having between twelve
and twenty-four participants so individuals typically interact with different counterparts in each round.
We study three main questions. First, is specialization in consumption and
production associated with the spontaneous emergence of decentralized, monetary trade as suggested by the theory of money? Second, does the inability to
establish long-term relationships within a stable group of traders also lead to a
decentralization of the process of exchange? Third, what is the impact of the
group size on the mode of exchange selected by experimental participants?
We find that decentralized markets less frequently emerge when subjects’ economic tasks are diversified (Rotating treatment), in line with the theory. Conversely, we do not generally find evidence for the theoretical view that difficulties in establishing long-term relationships have an effect on trade patterns
(Rematching treatment). Finally, there is evidence that centralized markets
more frequently emerge in groups of larger sizes (Large treatment); in this case,
subjects cannot interact as partners and appear to be more willing to sustain the
greater costs associated with setting up a centralized marketplace, instead of trading in isolation from other economic agents by exchanging money. This insight
suggests new directions for the study of money, which is typically based on models
in which individuals are restricted to meet and trade in pairs, even if they can
direct their search (e.g., see Corbae et al., 2003). Our study suggests there is
scope to improve the theoretical predictions by incorporating the possibility to
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endogenize the mode of market interaction.

2

Related experimental literature

There are several experiments on the use of money in decentralized trading models. Some experiments have studied commodity money systems, as we do, for
example the studies in Brown (1996) and Duffy and Ochs (1999). Those studies have primarily implemented designs to test the equilibrium predictions of the
commodity-money model described in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). In that setup,
three commodities exist each of which is characterized by a different holding cost.
Players start with a production commodity they do not wish to consume and can
costlessly barter it for their consumption good through a sequence of bilateral random exchanges. Importantly, players must use a commodity as a money in order
to consume because consumption takes place only if someone agrees to trade their
production for a good they do not wish to consume. These studies seek to uncover
what commodity or commodities will become the medium of exchange and, in particular, whether or not high-storage cost commodities will ever become a “money.”
In contrast, we study whether or not commodity-money systems spontaneously
emerge. In our experiment consumption does not require the existence of a commodity money because players can trade multilaterally and synchronously, and do
not need to hold anything but their own production.
Other experiments have studied the endogenous emergence of fiat monetary
systems and the behavioral role of money in supporting high-payoff equilibria.
In Camera et al. (2013) and Camera and Casari (2014), for example, groups of
strangers interact through a random sequence of helping games with unknown
opponents. By design, help is non-storable so there can be no commodity monies.
However, subjects are endowed with and can exchange intrinsically useless tokens
for help, if they wish, thus giving rise to fiat monetary exchange. By design, social
efficiency can be attained through a sequence of unilateral transfers of help that
do not involve any exchange of tokens. The data show that subjects frequently
trade help for tokens, and refuse to help those who cannot offer a token in ex-
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change. That is to say, fiat monetary systems spontaneously emerge even if they
are theoretically unnecessary to attain high-payoff equilibria. The use of tokens
as a fiat money helps players in coordinating on high-payoff equilibria, especially
when groups are large. The related paper in Duffy and Puzzello (2014) adds a
centralized market to this basic setup to test the model in Aliprantis et al. (2007).
Here, too, fiat monetary systems emerge, although this occurs primarily when
groups are sufficiently small. The study of the emergence of fiat money in Huber
et. al (2014) takes a different angle by showing that default laws and a “societal”
bank can provide a sufficient basis for the use of fiat money. Finally, there is a
number of studies in which trade can occur only by using money and all exchanges
take place in centralized marketplaces, as in the monetary experiments in McCabe
(1989), Marimon and Sunder (1994), Camera et al. (2003) and Deck et. al (2006),
for example.
All these studies assume an exogenous organization of exchange. In fact, even
if centralized and decentralized markets are available, as in Duffy and Puzzello
(2014), subjects are not free to choose where to trade. The novelty of our study is
that the organization of exchange is endogenous. Participants in our experiment
choose to either synchronize their exchanges in a centralized location, or to engage
in a sequence of pairwise asynchronous exchanges in decentralized locations, or to
remain in autarky. The two patterns of exchange carry different costs for players,
and give rise to two different equilibria: a non-monetary equilibrium based on centralized synchronous trading in which everyone consumes on every trading date,
and a commodity-money equilibrium based on decentralized asynchronous trading
in which players consume on alternate trading dates. This equilibrium multiplicity
gives rise to strategic uncertainty and coordination problems, which vary with the
complexity of the task and the size of the group as show in earlier studies, e.g, see
Van Huyk et al. (2007), Heinemann et al (1989) and Weber (2006) for example.
The experimental literature has focused on pure coordination games in which participants are homogeneous and their incentives are perfectly aligned. By contrast,
in our design incentives are misaligned because players are heterogeneous, due to
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their different specializations in production and consumption. Hence, though the
equilibrium with synchronous multilateral exchange maximizes social efficiency,
neither equilibrium maximizes the payoff of every type of player.

3

Experimental design

We start by presenting the Baseline design, and then discuss four treatment
manipulations: Baseline-Rotating, Rematching, Rematching-Rotating,
and Large (see Table 1).
The travelling game: The Baseline experiment consists of a coordination
task, called the travelling game illustrated in Figure 1. It is played by a group of
3 subjects who can earn benefits by meeting and trading with others.
At the start of the game each subject is randomly assigned to one of three
virtual islands j = 1, 2, 3. The island j corresponds to the subject’s production
and consumption specialization type (or simply, type): he produces one good j + 1
(modulo 3) that is of no value to him, and earns a benefit u only by obtaining
one good j, which he consumes upon receiving it. To earn this benefit, a subject
of type j must meet and trade with a counterpart who holds good j. To do so,
a subject can stay on his home island, hoping to be visited by other subjects, or
can travel round-trip to another island of his choice. Travel is costly; each leg of
travel with good k generates a loss ck with c1 < c2 < u < c3 . This all but rules
out travel with good 3 because travelling to trade good k is individually irrational,
as it cannot generate a positive net benefit u − ck . We set u = 12 points, while
c1 = 1, c2 = 10, and c3 = 15 points; 10 points were converted into 1 New Israeli
Shekel (NIS) at the end of the experiment. Subjects played multiple rounds of
this game.
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31
23

12

Figure 1: The travelling game

Notes: The larger number denotes the type and island of a player. The smaller number denotes
the player’s production good. The dotted arrows denote the possible directions of travel. In the
experiment type 1 = fisherman (produces good 2 =fish), 2 = farmer (produces good 3 =bread),
and 3 = hunter (produces good 1 =fowl).

A round of play: Each round is divided into two stages. In each stage subjects
make independent and simultaneous choices, without the possibility to communicate with others.
In the travelling stage subjects observe the distribution of goods across islands
and must choose whether or not to travel. As a result of all travelling decisions,
a subject can meet one or two other subjects (=bilateral or trilateral match), or
can remain unmatched. Matched subjects proceed to the trading stage, in which
they participate in a direct mechanism that allows them to re-allocate their goods
(=trade). Trade takes place if and only if the matched subjects agree to the
proposed reallocation; otherwise, everyone exits the meeting with the good they
carried. Hence, there can be either trade or autarky, and unilateral transfers are
impossible, which reflects the assumptions of the standard monetary model where
all exchanges are quid-pro-quo (Ostroy and Starr, 1990; Starr, 1972).
In a bilateral match, subjects simultaneously choose whether or not to swap
their goods; trade occurs if and only if there is mutual consent. In a trilateral
match, if all good types are available subjects are given the option to form a
trading chain, whereby the subject holding good j = 1, 2, 3 transfers it to subject
j. Trade occurs if and only if there is mutual consent, in which case every subject
receives their consumption good. If there is no mutual consent, or if not all good
8

types are available in the meeting, then each participant can propose a bilateral
trade. Hence, in a trilateral match there are three possible outcomes: there is
either one trilateral trade, one bilateral trade, or no trade at all. Round-trip travel
implies that each subject j ends the round on island j. Subjects who traveled,
traded and consumed do not pay any travel cost for the return trip to their island
since they no longer have a good in inventory. In the following round, subjects
who traded and consumed receive a new good j + 1, while everyone else carries
over their previous round’s inventory. Subjects cannot hold more than one good
at a time.
A session: Each session involves a multiple of 3 participants (min = 6, max = 27,
depending on subjects’ availability). At the start of the session subjects are divided
into groups of three, and each subject is randomly assigned a type j = 1, 2, 3.
During the entire session subjects interact within the same group and maintain
the same type j.
Each session consists of several sequences of travelling games. Such a sequence
is called a “block;” it starts and terminates simultaneously for all participants.
Each block is composed of an uncertain number of rounds of the travelling game.
Subjects are informed that they will play six rounds, and from then on, after each
round the block will continue with probability 0.75, and otherwise it will stop.
The expected duration of each block is thus 9 rounds. In the experiment, a computer randomly selected an integer number between 1 and 100 from a uniform
distribution, and displayed it to subjects. The block terminated when a number
greater than 75 was selected. We can interpret the probability 0.75 as the geometric discount factor of a risk-neutral subject (Camera and Casari, 2014). When
a block stopped a new one started if there was sufficient time left in the session;
otherwise, the session ended. Subjects were informed of this procedure and that
they would play at most six blocks.
The design of the block (a fixed even number of rounds plus an additional
random number of rounds) allows for the spontaneous emergence of either one of
two prototypical trading institutions. First, subjects can resort to centralized trade
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based on one-round trilateral exchange. Second, subjects can choose to engage
in decentralized trade based on a two-round sequence of bilateral exchanges. The
second type of exchange minimizes transportation costs but requires intertemporal
coordination; the first one increases transportation costs but removes the need
for intertemporal coordination. Running multiple rounds in a block facilitates
learning of a complex task, involving not only travelling decisions but also trading
decisions. Because each new block re-initializes the distribution of endowments in
a fixed group, running multiple blocks also facilitates learning and coordination
on a common trade pattern.
Other treatments: The treatments Baseline-Rotating, Rematching, RematchingRotating, and Large, all build upon Baseline.
Recall that in Baseline subjects repeatedly trade within a fixed group of
three participants. In the two Rematching treatments trade counterparts change
throughout the session: when a block ends, new groups are formed by randomly
mixing the session’s participants according to a strangers matching protocol.
In Baseline subjects are specialized in their production and consumption
because their type j is fixed throughout the session. In the two Rotating treatments subjects are diversified in their economic activities. Here, the subject’s type
alternates throughout the session: when a block ends subjects are assigned a different specialization type with round-robin alternation, i.e., 1,2,3,1,2,3; 2,3,1,2,3,1,
etc. This design is simply a dynamic interpretation of the static concept of specialization/diversification found in the monetary literature.2
2

In the typical monetary model a specialized agents is one who can produce just one type of
good in a period, for their entire life, while a diversified agent can produce one of several types
of goods (none of which they can consume).
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Treatment

Sessions

Size

Groups

Types

Rounds

Blocks

Baseline
Baseline-R
Rematching
Rematching-R
Large:
N = 12
N = 18
N = 24

3
3
2
2

3
3
3
3

fixed
fixed
mixed
mixed

fixed
mixed
fixed
mixed

55.6
48
42.5
38

6+p
6
4.5+p
5

12
18
24

fixed
fixed
fixed

fixed
fixed
fixed

35
34.3
28

4+p
3.3+p
3+p

(30)
(30)
(42)
(39)

2 (24)
3 (54)
2 (48)

Table 1: Treatments
Notes: R =Rotating. Sessions: the number of sessions conducted (in parentheses the total
number of participants). Size: group size. Rounds & Blocks: average number of rounds played
in a session (excluding practice blocks) & average number of blocks in a session; +p= session
started with an additional, unpaid practice block. Dates of sessions (month-year): Baseline 1-,
3-, 5- & 6-2014; Baseline-R, 12-2013, 4- & 5-2014; Rematching, 5- & 6-2014; RematchingR, 11-2013; Large, 3- & 4-2013, 5- & 6-2014. In all treatments u = 12, c1 = 1, and c2 = 10;
c3 = 15 for all treatments except Large where c3 = 20.

In the Large treatment we alter the Baseline design by increasing the size
of groups to N = 12, 18, 24, which allows us to study meetings among strangers
instead of partners.3
Each island j is home to N/3 subjects of type j. If n ≤ N/3 subjects j
stay on island j, then the island can host at most n meetings, either bilateral or
trilateral, which involve agents of different types. Those who travel to an island
are matched at random with those who remained on the island. Hence, an island
with n subjects of each type has n trilateral meetings; otherwise, because of the
random assignment, trilateral meetings may not occur even if the island hosts all
three different types. Finally, if there are more visitors of a single type on island j
than subjects of type j, then some of the visitors will remain unmatched, though
the short side of the market is fully matched.4
3

We also have c3 = 20 instead of c3 = 15, but this is both theoretically and empirically inconsequential. Large sessions were run first and a small number of subjects accumulated losses
by travelling with good 3 (see Table 2). To avoid this, c3 was lowered to 15 in all subsequent
treatments; doing so is theoretically inconsequential since travelling with good 3 is individually
irrational as long as u − c3 < 0, and it did not empirically induce more travel with good 3
(see discussion about travel around Table 2). Therefore, there was neither a theoretical nor an
empirical need to rerun all of the Large sessions with c3 = 15.
4
For example, consider a group N=12. If everyone is present on island 3, then four trilateral
matches are formed, each including three different specialization types allocated at random.
Now suppose six subjects are on island 3: two type 1, one type 2, and three type 3. Here, there
may be one trilateral match (types 1,2,3) and one bilateral match (types 1,3), or there can be
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Subject population and aggregate statistics: Overall, we recruited 267 undergraduate students from Bar Ilan University (102 males, 165 females). All subjects were recruited through class announcements, social media and advertisements
on campus. We ran 17 sessions (see Table 1).
The experiment was programmed and conducted using the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions (see Appendix) were read aloud at the start of
the experiment and left on the subjects’ desks. All sessions were conducted in
the Bar-Ilan University experimental lab, where subjects were visually isolated
in separate computer carrels. Average earnings per subject were 80 NIS (min
= 50 NIS, max = 122 NIS).5 Payments were structured so that subjects could
potentially earn similar amounts per round of play in each treatment. In the
Rotating treatments, this was done by summing up all points earned in the
session; in the other treatments payments were re-scaled by the maximum points
a subject could have earned in the session, given his fixed type (see instructions in
Appendix). Subjects completed between 34 and 65 rounds in a session. All sessions
lasted two hours including the reading of instructions, a quiz, and payments.

4

Theoretical considerations

Time is indexed t = 1, 2 . . .. There is a constant population of three players who
live on three different islands. A player is labeled j = 1, 2, 3, which denotes the
consumption good of the player as well as the player’s home island. Each player j
derives utility u > 0 from consuming good j, and discounts future utility at rate
β ∈ (0, 1). On the initial period, player j is endowed with good type j +1 (mod 3),
which generates no utility to him. Goods are indivisible, cannot be disposed of,
and can be stored only one at a time, but can also be traded one-for-one. If player
j trades his inventory for good j in period t, then he immediately consumes it and
is endowed with one new good j + 1 at the start of period t + 1. It follows that
three bilateral matches (two have types 1,3 and one has types 2,3). If, instead, we had three
type 1, two type 2, and one type 3, then there would be only one trilateral match (types 1,2,3)
choosing each type 1 with probability 1/3 and each type 2 with probability 1/2.
5
When the sessions were run the minimum wage in Israel was 24 NIS, while average student
wages were around 30 NIS.
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all players have some good at the start of each period (see Goldberg, 2007, for a
related model with a continuum of players).
Player j starts each period on island j and has the option of making one roundtrip to any island i 6= j, during the period. Hence, j denotes player j’s island at
the start and end of a period. Carrying good k = 1, 2, 3 costs ck for each leg of
travel, with 0 < c1 < c2 < u < c3 , so only travel with goods 1 or 2 may benefit a
player. Players make their travel choices independently, simultaneously, and without communicating with one another. Hence, a player can either be unmatched,
in a bilateral match, or in a trilateral match in any given period. Matched players
observe the type and inventory of everyone in their match, and are then asked
whether they would like to trade. All trade decisions are made simultaneously
without communication with others. Players cannot make unilateral transfers, or
give gifts to another player.6 In a bilateral match in which the players hold different goods, the player is offered to trade quid-pro-quo with his counterpart. In a
trilateral match in which all three goods are available the player is first offered to
implement a trading chain. The trading chain is governed by a direct mechanism
according to which player j agrees to give a good to one of the two other players
conditional on receiving a good from the third player. The proposed exchange is
implemented if and only if there is consensus in the match. If one or more players
does not acquiesce, the host (the person associated with the island where players
are located) is then offered the possibility of a bilateral trade with a player who
holds a different goods than he holds. If both other players hold goods that he
does not hold, he is asked with which player (if any) he wishes to trade. Bilateral exchange occurs if and only if there is consent from both the party and the
counterpart.
There are generally many equilibria in this game, in which actions may or may
not depend on histories of play. We focus on Markov-perfect equilibria because the
literature on decentralized trade and the microfoundations of money has traditionally restricted attention to these types of outcomes (e.g., see Kiyotaki and Wright,
6

Hence, choosing not to travel and not to trade for the duration of the game is equivalent to free
disposal of goods.
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1989). In particular, we direct our attention to two patterns of trade that are the
focus of theoretical analyses (Camera, 2000; Goldberg, 2007). The first pattern
consists of a decentralized trading arrangement in which players trade sequentially
and bilaterally on different islands. This dynamic trading arrangement minimizes
transportation costs, but reduces the frequency of consumption. The second pattern consists of a centralized trading arrangement in which all players congregate
on the same island in each period. This static trading arrangement maximizes the
frequency of consumption but increases overall transportation costs.
Figures 2-3 illustrate the two arrangements.

The assumption u < c3 all

but rules out travel of a player 2 holding his production good, under either
trade pattern.7 Under decentralized trade, two players travel with the lowest
transportation-cost good (good 1) on alternate dates and to different islands; on
each island there is a bilateral meeting where the visitor exchanges good 1 for
his consumption good. Under centralized exchange, the player with the highest
transportation-cost good remains on his island, which the other two players visit
in each period; on the island there is a trilateral meeting each period in which each
player j receives his consumption good from player j − 1 (mod 3) and transfers
his good to player j + 1 (mod 3).

4.1

Decentralized asynchronous trade

Definition 1 (Decentralized trade strategy). In any period t ≥ 1 player 1
never travels, while player j = 2, 3 travels only to trade good 1 for good j on island
j − 1 (mod 3). If player j = 1, 2, 3 is in a bilateral match, then he trades his
inventory quid-pro-quo for goods j and 1. If player j = 1, 2, 3 is in a trilateral
match, then he transfers his inventory to player j+1 only conditionally on receiving
good j from someone else.
If all players adopt the strategy in Definition 1, then we say that a decentralized
market (DM) emerges in which the asynchronous bilateral exchanges create an
explicit need for a medium of exchange. Hence, DM trades support monetary
trade. Good 1 serves the role of money because it is not always acquired to be
7

In any Markov equilibrium in which player 2 travels with his production good in some round,
he loses even if he consumes in that round. Hence, he can profitably deviate by avoiding travel
in that round.
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consumed, but, also to be re-traded for another good. Our design thus makes the
transactions role of money explicit. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of objects
and the pattern of DM trade in odd and even periods. In equilibrium, player
2 acts as a market-maker who bilaterally trades in every period with alternating
counterparts. Trilateral matches never occur in equilibrium, although the strategy
specifies what to do in case such meetings occur, off-equilibrium.
In each period the actions of a player depend on his state (his inventory at the
start of the period) and the distribution of goods in the economy. The distribution
of objects at the start of a period t is such that: player 3 has good 1; player 1
has good 2; player 2 has good 3 in t odd and good 1 in t even. All DM exchanges
are bilateral and players trade either to acquire their consumption good or a good
that is cheaper to carry than the one they have. Player 1 never moves from island
1 and only one of the other two players the one who has good 1 travels in each
period. In odd periods t = 1, 3, . . . player 3 has good 1, and travels to island 2
to buy good 3 from player 2. In even periods t = 2, 4 . . . player 2 has good 1
and travels to island 1 to buy good 2 from player 1. Off equilibrium, if player j
meets more than one counterpart, then he attempts a trilateral trade; otherwise,
he attempts a bilateral trade for his consumption good, if possible, or for good 1.
If the other two players have an identical good and player j wishes to acquire it,
then j trades with the player who consumes his production good, i.e., player j + 1.

15

periods. We need u > c1 since otherwise player 2 would have no incentive to travel
and trade on island 1 in even periods.
To understand welfare, notice that in each period the player who travels (type
3 or 2) also consumes; this gives us the first term in v. The other term in v is the
consumption of the type 1 player, who never travels, and consumes only in even
periods. Note also that given the experimental parameters reported in Table 1
and β = 0.75 we have
v2 < v1 < v3 in odd periods, and

v3 < v2 < v1 in even periods.

In a decentralized trade equilibrium player 2 acts as an intermediary. He alternates
between being a market maker, who makes a market for good 1 (which he cannot
consume), and travelling to buy his consumption good. Because travelling is costly
and the future is discounted, player 2 is never the top earner. The top earners
either do not travel, or trade only for their consumption good.

4.2

Centralized synchronous trade

Definition 2 (Centralized trade strategy). In any period t = 1, 2 . . . player 2
remains on island 2, while player j = 1, 3 travels to island 2 if and only if every
player j = 1, 2, 3 holds their production good j + 1. In every meeting, player j
transfers good j + 1 to player j + 1 conditionally on receiving good j from someone
else. Otherwise, player j keeps his good.
The centralized trade strategy is time-invariant and depends on the distribution
of goods across players. In equilibrium, everyone holds their production good and
a centralized exchange opens on island 2 in every period. The good that is most
costly to transport never moves because players 3 and 1 travel to island 2, while
player 2 never travels. Hence, in equilibrium, matches are trilateral and all players
synchronously trade and consume in each period. Bilateral matches never occur
in equilibrium. Figure 3 provides an illustration.
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and average welfare
w :=

c1 + c2
u
−
,
1 − β 3(1 − β)

in each period of the game.
Corollary 1. If c2 < u < c2 (1 + β), then equilibria with decentralized markets and
centralized markets coexist. Equilibrium with centralized trade maximizes welfare
but does not Pareto-dominate equilibrium with decentralized trade.
The proofs are in the Appendix. Equilibrium with CM trade generates more
travel costs due to the centralization and the simultaneity of all exchanges. Yet,
it also maximizes average welfare because every player consumes in every period,
unlike DM trade, and the increment in consumption utility is larger than the
increment in travel cost c2 relative to DM trade. Neither equilibrium, however, is
Pareto-dominant. Type 1 prefers the DM equilibrium because he does not travel;
type 2 prefers the CM equilibrium because he consumes every period and bears
no travel cost; type 3 prefers the CM equilibrium because he earns u − c1 every
period instead of every other period.
In the CM equilibrium type 2 also acts as an intermediary, although he no
longer makes a market as in the DM equilibrium. Rather, he facilitates trade
by maintaining a centralized exchange on his island in every period. Because
travelling is costly, type 2 gains from making a market and is the top earner in
equilibrium. The lowest earner is now type 1, who has to travel with the highercost good among all goods that are transported. In all treatments both patterns
of trade, decentralized and centralized, are equilibria because in the experiment
c2 = 10 < u = 12 < c2 (1 + β) = 17.5. Therefore, both DM and CM can
spontaneously emerge. However, CM trade involves static play as opposed to DM
trade, which is based on a two-round cycle of play. This suggests that CM trade
might be cognitively simpler for unsophisticated and inexperienced subjects in a
laboratory experiment.

5

Results

We start with an overview of the data by presenting aggregate information about
the incidence of CM and DM play in the experiment. Then, we formulate testable
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hypotheses and present results of the econometric analysis.8

5.1

Aggregate overview

Table 2 summarizes three distinct pieces of data that help us identify aggregate
patterns of trade. For the sake of clarity, we will use the terminology used in the
sessions whereby player 1 is a Fisherman who produces fish and consumes fowl,
player 2 is a Farmer who produces bread and consumes fish, and player 3 is a
Hunter who produces fowl and consumes bread.
Inventory: Consider the top panel in Table 2. Under CM everyone always holds
their production good, while under DM Farmers alternate between holding bread
and fowl which is the medium of exchange. By design, no one could hold a good
they consumed, so if participants of type j did not hold their production good j +1
(mod 3), then their inventory consisted of the remaining good j − 1 (mod 3). In
the experiment, Hunters and Fishermen held their production goods in at least
95% of the rounds. Farmers held their production good in 74% of the rounds,
which is almost exactly halfway between the two theoretical possibilities of 100
and 50 percent in CM and DM, respectively. This is a first indication that both
CM and DM emerged in the experiment, but neither was predominant.
8

The analysis utilizes blocks 2-6 of each session of the treatments. The first block is excluded
because in some sessions it was an unpaid practice block (see Table 1). Those sessions had an
additional block 7, which is also excluded from the analysis.
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Table 2: Inventory, travel & trade decisions

Own production
Theory
CM (Centralized Market)
DM (Decentralized Market)
Data
Overall N=3034
Small groups N=1740
Large groups N=1294
Travel intensity & direction
Theory
CM
DM
All hold production
Data
Overall N=3034
Small groups N=1740
All hold production N=1182
Large groups N=1294
All hold production N=260
Trade frequency & modality
Theory
CM
DM
All hold production
Data
Overall N= 3034
Small groups N=1740
All hold production N=1182
Large groups N=1294
All hold production N=260

3=Hunter
fowl

Player type
1=Fisherman
fish

2=Farmer
bread

1
1

1
1

1
.5

.96
.95
.97

.98
.99
.97

.74
.72
.77

islands
1, 2

islands
2, 3

islands
3, 1

0, 1
0, .5
0, 1

1, 0
0, 0
0, 0

0, 0
0, .5
0, 0

.06,
.05,
.04,
.07,
.05,

.70
.65
.81
.77
.88

.29,
.27,
.36,
.31,
.42,

.05
.05
.05
.05
.06

.02,
.02,
.01,
.02,
.02,

.24
.24
.01
.24
.05

Tri, Bi

Tri, Bi

Tri, Bi

1, 0
0, .5
0, 1

1, 0
0, .5
0, 0

1, 0
0, 1
0, 1

.23,
.22,
.33,
.24,
.37,

.28
.29
.38
.27
.32

.23,
.22,
.33,
.24,
.37,

.24
.24
.03
.23
.04

.23,
.22,
.33,
.24,
.37,

.45
.48
.37
.41
.20

Notes: Each cell reports the average relative frequency of observations. One observation =
one subject-type in a round; blocks 2-6, treatments. Own production cells identify how often
the player held his own production good at the start of a round. Travel intensity & direction
cells identify how often the player traveled and the island visited (1,2 or 3). Trade frequency
& modality cells identify how often the player traded and the modality (Tri= trilateral trade,
Bi= trilateral trade). Small groups = three participants. Large groups = more than three participants. All hold production = observations where everyone in the group has their production
good at the start of the round; note that in large groups, at least one unit of each good type
was available in every round of the data collected.

Travel intensity & direction: The middle panel in Table 2 reveals that the
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travel patterns associated with CM and DM share an element of theoretical commonality: no one should travel to island 3 and Hunters should never travel to
island 1. The data are broadly consistent with these travel patterns. There was
only a small amount of travel between islands 1 and 3 about 5 percent of the
rounds and an even smaller frequency of Farmers’ travel to island 3. In particular, travel by Farmers with bread remains minimal in all treatments and the
greater travel cost in Large treatments (c3 = 20 vs. c3 = 15 in all other treatments) did not induce Farmers to travel with bread less than in other treatments.
These observations are in line with the theory, since travelling with bread is by
design individually irrational.
To identify whether CM or DM was more prevalent, consider travel choices
when everyone held their production good, so that both CM and DM are feasible.
As seen in the Table, these can be distinguished by the travel choice of Fishermen,
who are pivotal to the establishment of either equilibrium, and travel to island 2
only under CM. In the data, they traveled to island 2 between 36 percent (small
groups) and 42 percent (large groups) of the rounds, suggesting that they favored
DM over CM trade. This preference is in line with the theory since DM generates
higher payoffs to Fishermen than CM. In comparison, Hunters, who should travel
to island 2 in every round, did so between 81 and 88 percent of the rounds,
slightly more than twice the Fishermen’s frequency. The travel patterns are a
second indication that both CM and DM emerged in the experiment.
Trade frequency & modality: Consider the bottom panel in Table 2. Under
CM everyone participates in a trilateral trade in every round. Under DM trade
is only bilateral, with Hunters and Fishermen trading in half the rounds and only
Farmers trading in every period. The data show that Hunters and Fishermen did
not trade in every round. The overall frequencies of trilateral and bilateral trade
are similar for Hunters and Fishermen. Trilateral trade occurred in 23 percent
of the rounds, overall (22 and 24 percent, in small and large groups). Instead,
we find that DM trade occurred in 35 percent of the rounds, overall (38 and 31
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percent, in small and large groups).9 Again, this is an indication that both CM
and DM emerged in the experiment, with slightly greater incidence of DM trade.
Overall, this aggregate evidence suggests that efficiency maximization is not
the empirically dominant equilibrium selection criterion in this game. CM trade
maximizes the frequency of trade and consumption, and social welfare. Yet, subjects did not select CM more frequently than DM. What influenced subjects’
choices in the experiment? We formulate three hypotheses that stem from the
theory of money and the experimental literature, and test these using the results
in the different treatments.
First, note that CM trade involves a time-invariant repetition of the same
choice in each round of play. This is unlike DM trade, which instead requires intertemporal coordination. The repetitive, history-independent nature of trilateral
trade makes the CM strategy cognitively simpler than the DM strategy. Cognitive
simplicity is especially valuable to subjects who wish to coordinate on equilibrium
play in large groups, because coordination is typically more difficult in large than
small groups (Camera et al., 2013; Weber, 2006). This yields the following:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): DM trade is less likely to emerge under Large than under
other treatments.
Second, the foundations of money literature has put forward the notion that the
use of media of exchange naturally emerges when economic interactions are characterized by trading frictions in the form of meetings of short duration with random
counterparts (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989), as opposed to long-lasting meetings
between partners. In our setup only DM trade involves the use of a medium of
exchange. The Rematching treatment breaks down the long-run interaction in
a stable group of Baseline, because groups are destroyed at the end of each
9

This is not directly discernible from the Table. Rather, it is calculated by counting two consecutive rounds consistent with the two-step sequence in Figure 2. That is, we say that DM
trade occurs in two consecutive rounds if in the first round the Farmer does not travel and
trades his production for good 1, and in the subsequent round the Farmer travels to island 1
and exchanges good 1 for good 2.
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block and randomly re-formed at the start of the following block. As a result we
formulate:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): DM trade is more likely to emerge under Rematching than
under other treatments.
Finally, the foundations of money literature has also put forward the notion
that specialization naturally leads to the adoption of media of exchange to facilitate trade (e.g., Camera et al., 2003; Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989). In our setup
the Rotating treatment exhibits diversification, as subjects alternate between
the different production-consumption specialization types from block to block. As
a result we have:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): DM trade is less likely to emerge under Rotating than
under other treatments.
Our initial analysis will consider data aggregated at the block level, after which
we will turn to individual choice data. Table 3 reports linear regressions based on
the aggregated block level data, using the same indicators presented in Table 2.
Production share is simply the share of group participants holding own production
at start of a round. Each of these indicators, production share, travel intensity
and trade volume, should increase with the prevalence of CM equilibria.
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Dep. var.=production share
Rotation

Model 1
0.035∗∗∗
(3.550)
-0.014
(-1.412)

Rematching
Large

0.881∗∗∗
(36.788)
yes
205
Model 1
0.101∗∗∗
(5.670)
0.043∗
(1.672)

constant
controls
N
Dep. var.=travel intensity
Rotation
Rematching
Large

0.392∗∗∗
(7.055)
yes
205
Model 1
0.101∗
(1.874)
0.019
(0.438)

constant
controls
N
Dep. var.=trade volume
Rotation
Rematching
Large

0.476∗∗∗
(3.898)
yes
205

Constant
Controls
N

Model 2
0.037∗∗∗
(3.760)
-0.014
(-1.431)
0.024
(1.152)
0.870∗∗∗
(41.499)
yes
229
Model 2
0.100∗∗∗
(5.588)
0.041
(1.638)
0.124∗∗∗
(4.773)
0.403∗∗∗
(8.496)
yes
229
Model 2
0.100∗
(1.941)
0.016
(0.383)
0.065
(1.107)
0.482∗∗∗
(4.498)
yes
229

Table 3: Production share, Trade intensity and Trade volume.

Notes: Generalized linear model regressions. One observation = average in a block. Blocks 2-6.
Model 1: groups N = 3 only; Model 2: all groups. Production share = share of group participants
holding own production at start of a round; Travel intensity = share of group participants who
travel in a round; Trade volume = share of group participants who trade in a round. Rotation
takes value 0 if participants maintained the same specialization type in each block of the session
(1, otherwise); Rematching takes value 0 if participants remained in the same group in each
block of the session (1, otherwise); Large takes value 0 if participants interacted in a group with
N = 3 subjects (1, otherwise). Controls include factor variables for blocks 3-6, block duration
(number of rounds in the block, number of rounds in preceding block), and fraction of males in
the group. t statistics in parentheses with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
session level. ∗ p ≤ .1, ∗∗ p ≤ .05, ∗∗∗ p ≤ .01

The most robust finding is that there is strong evidence that diversification
altered aggregate trade patterns as predicted in hypothesis H3. The estimated
coefficients on the dummy variable Rotation in Table 3 are generally highly signif25

icant. Introducing rotation in roles slightly but significantly tilted the composition
of the average inventory toward storing own production (top panel). It also supported a highly significant increase in the intensity of travel (middle panel), and in
trade volume, although this last effect is only weakly significant (bottom panel).
Group instability, however, does not appear to exert a significant effect on the
aggregate patterns of interaction (H2). The estimated coefficient on the dummy
variable Rematching is weakly significant only for travel intensity and only in
Model 1 (small economies) of Table 3, and the sign is contradictory to the hypothesis.
Finally, there is evidence that trading large groups led to more travel (H1);
the estimated coefficient on the dummy Large in the middle panel of Table 3 is
positive, large and highly significant. Yet, we have no evidence of an impact on
either inventories or trade volume (top and bottom panels).
These results suggest that CM was more frequently adopted under Rotation than under Baseline. The jury is out, however, with regards to whether
aggregate trade patterns are affected by Large and Rematching. Still, it is
important to note that travel intensity for which significant effects were found
reflects individual choices, while the other two metrics production share and
trade volume reflect an outcome that is affected by collective choices and by circumstances, such as random meetings. It would seem that reaching conclusions
requires studying disaggregated data and choices at the individual level, to which
we now turn.

5.2

Individual-level analysis

We report four main results all of which deal with whether or not Rematching,
Large and/or Rotation affect the incidence of trilateral trade.
Result 1 (The impact of diversification and group size). Centralized markets more frequently emerged with Rotation and in Large economies than in
Baseline. Rematching did not significantly alter the patterns of trade.
Evidence is provided in Table 4, which presents the marginal effects from logit
regressions, with the dependent variable taking the value one when there is a
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trilateral trade in a round and zero otherwise.
Models 1 and 2 include all observations, independent of whether a trilateral
trade was feasible. Model 1 includes only observations from small economies (one
subject of each type) and Model 2 includes larger economies also. Trilateral trade
is feasible only if all three good types are available in the economy. The variable
% Feasible CM is the percentage of possible trilateral trades in the economy in
that period. In small economies this variable can only be 0, if some good is not
present, or 1 if all goods are present. In large economies, this variable can also
take intermediate values because there is more than one individual associated with
a player type. Models 3 and 4 include only rounds in which all subjects held their
production good, so % Feasible CM is always equal to one and is therefore omitted.
When subjects rotated across types over the course of the session, there was
greater coordination on trilateral exchange. The positive coefficient on the Rotation dummy variable is highly significant. The probability of executing a trilateral trade increases by 24%-34% relative to Baseline. This indicates that subjects more frequently coordinated on setting up a Centralized Market. The Large
dummy variable shows that a similar result holds with respect to large economies,
with trilateral trade increasing by 19%-32% relative to Baseline. However, the
regressions in Table 4 provide no evidence that Rematching alters the trade
pattern. Thus, on the outcome level we have strong support for H1 and H3, but
little for H2.
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Dep Var. =1
if trilateral trade
Rotation
Rematching

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.245∗∗∗
(3.502)
-0.001
(-0.008)

0.240∗∗∗
(2.993)
0.010
(0.199)
0.190∗∗
(2.200)
0.475∗∗∗
(5.055)
yes
3034
0.169

0.313 ∗∗∗
(3.471)
0.025
(0.259)

0.336∗∗∗
(3.513)
0.019
(0.202)
0.316∗∗
(1.998)

yes
1182
0.127

yes
1442
0.095

Large
% Feasible CM
Controls
N
pseudo R2

yes
1740
0.124

Table 4: The incidence of trilateral trade.

Notes: Marginal effects from logit regression. One observation = one round in a block. All
treatments, blocks 2-6. Dependent variable =1 if Farmer traded trilaterally in the round. Model
1 : N = 3 groups only; Model 2 : all group sizes. Model 3 : N = 3 groups only, and only rounds
in which every player stores their own production. Model 4 : all group sizes but only rounds in
which every player stores their own production. Rotation takes value 0 if participants maintained
the same specialization type in each block of the session (1, otherwise); Rematching takes value
0 if participants remained in the same group in each block of the session (1, otherwise); Large
takes value 0 if participants interacted in a group with N = 3 subjects (1, otherwise); % Feasible
CM corresponds to the fraction of CM trades that are possible in a round of groups of any size N
(it is defined as the minimum number of goods of any type in the round divided by the number
N/3 of each player type); this variable always equals 1 in Model 4, so it is omitted. Controls
include factor variables for blocks 3-6, sex, and a dummy variable taking value 1 in rounds 6
and above. t statistics in parentheses with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
session level. ∗ p ≤ .1, ∗∗ p ≤ .05, ∗∗∗ p ≤ .01

To further strengthen these conclusions, the next three results study the individual choices of the two pivotal players: Farmers and Fishermen. Fishermen are
pivotal because CM emerges only if they choose to travel to meet Farmers (Figure
3). Farmers are pivotal because DM emerges only if they agree to exchange their
production with that of Hunters’ (Figure 2).
Result 2 (Travel by Fishermen). Fishermen more frequently travelled to meet
Farmers under Rotation and under Large than under Baseline.
The supporting evidence is presented in Table 5. Recall that Fishermen never
travel under DM, they always travel (to island 2) under CM, and they derive a
greater payoff from DM than from CM. We know that if Fishermen travel, they
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go to island 2 (Table 2). We thus ask: given that both types of markets can be
created (CM and DM), do Fishermen travel more in some treatments than others?
Dep Var. =1 if travel
Rotation
Rematching

Model 1
0.338∗∗∗
(4.976)
-0.019
(-0.235)

Large
% Feasible CM
Controls
N
pseudo R2

yes
1182
0.109

Model 2
0.351∗∗∗
(4.701)
-0.040
(-0.506)
0.208∗
(1.835)
0.436∗∗
(2.460)
yes
2476
0.093

Model 3
0.348∗∗∗
(4.959)
-0.030
(-0.368)
0.251∗∗
(2.424)
yes
1442
0.098

Table 5: Fisherman’s travel choice.

Notes: Marginal effects from logit regression. One observation = one round in a block when all
good types are available. All treatments, blocks 2-6. Dependent variable =1 if subject held own
production at the start of the round. Model 1 : N = 3 groups only; Model 2 : all group sizes.
Model 3 : all group sizes but only rounds in which every players stores their own production.
Rotation takes value 0 if participants maintained the same specialization type in each block of
the session (1, otherwise); Rematching takes value 0 if participants remained in the same group
in each block of the session (1, otherwise); Large takes value 0 if participants interacted in a
group with N = 3 subjects (1, otherwise). % Feasible CM corresponds to the fraction of CM
trades that are possible in a round of groups of any size N (it is defined as the minimum number
of goods of any type in the round divided by the number N/3 of each player type); this variable
always equals 1 in Model 3, so it is omitted. Controls include factor variables for blocks 3-6,
sex, and a dummy variable taking value 1 in rounds 6 and above. t statistics in parentheses
with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the session level. ∗ p ≤ .1, ∗∗ p ≤ .05, ∗∗∗
p ≤ .01

Table 5 reports the marginal effects from logit regressions regarding Fishermen’s travel outcome in a round, when all goods are available. In Model 2 this
includes all observations for which at least one good of each type was available,
while in Model 3 we only consider rounds in which all subjects held their own production good. In keeping with previous results, we observe a significantly greater
probability of travel under Rotation and Large than under Baseline, with
the former raising the probability of travel by more than 33% and Large by more
than 20%. Here too, Rematching does not seem to affect the Fishermen’s travel
decisions. The estimated coefficients on the dummy Rematching in Table 5 are
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the right sign, but insignificant.
Result 3 (Bilateral trade by Farmers). Farmers less frequently agree to bilaterally trade their production good for the Hunter’s production under Rotation
and Large than under Baseline.
Supporting evidence comes from the regressions in Table 6, which considers
the trade outcome for Farmers who hold bread and are in a bilateral meeting with
a Hunter with fowl.
In the meeting Farmers are offered the medium of exchange (fowl) by the
Hunter. Farmers earn more from CM than from DM trade, hence they may not
want to coordinate on DM trade. If so, then we should see that Farmers are less
likely to bilaterally trade for something that is not their consumption good.
Dep Var. = 1 if trade Model 1
Rotation
-0.061
(-1.098)
Rematching
-0.012
(-0.284)
Large

Model 2
-0.134∗
(-1.858)
-0.052
(-0.812)
-0.354∗∗∗
(-3.052)
yes
yes
565
1034
0.088
0.098

Controls
N
pseudo R2

Table 6: Trade outcome for a Farmer-Hunter meeting.

Notes: Marginal effects from logit regression. One observation = one round in a block when the
subject is in a meeting with a Hunter & both hold the production good (bread). All treatments,
blocks 2-6. Model 1: groups N = 3 only; Model 2: all groups. Dependent variable = 1 if subject
trades. Rotation takes value 0 if participants maintained the same specialization type in each
block of the session (1, otherwise); Rematching takes value 0 if participants remained in the same
group in each block of the session (1, otherwise); Large takes value 0 if participants interacted
in a group with N = 3 subjects (1, otherwise). Controls include factor variables for blocks 3-6,
sex, and a dummy variable taking value 1 in rounds 6 and above. t statistics in parentheses
with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the session level. ∗ p ≤ .1, ∗∗ p ≤ .05, ∗∗∗
p ≤ .01

There is some evidence that, under Rotation, Farmers are less likely to trade
their consumption good for a medium of exchange. The Rotation coefficient is
negative and significant in Model 2 of Table 6. The coefficient on the Large dummy
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is negative and significant when we pool all data. In addition, we find that Farmers
are more likely to hold their own production good under Rotation. This evidence
comes from the regression in Table 7, where the dependent variable takes the
value one in rounds in which subjects in a Farmer role held their production good.
A greater probability of holding own production suggests a greater disposition
towards adopting CM trade.
Dep Var. = 1 if hold own production
Rotation
Rematching

Model 1
0.088∗∗∗
(3.644)
-0.072∗∗∗
(-2.718)

Large
Controls
N
pseudo R2

yes
1740
0.022

Model 2
0.087∗∗∗
(4.010)
-0.070∗∗
(-2.523)
0.043
(0.689)
yes
3034
0.013

Table 7: Product held by Farmer.

Notes: Marginal effects from logit regressions. One observation = one round in a block. All
treatments, blocks 2-6. Dependent variable =1 if subject held own production at the start
of the round. Model 1: groups N = 3 only; Model 2: all groups. Rotation takes value 0 if
participants maintained the same specialization type in each block of the session (1, otherwise);
Rematching takes value 0 if participants remained in the same group in each block of the session
(1, otherwise); Large takes value 0 if participants interacted in a group with N = 3 subjects (1,
otherwise). Controls include factor variables for blocks 3-6, sex, and a dummy variable taking
value 1 in rounds 6 and above. t statistics in parentheses with robust standard errors adjusted
for clustering at the session level. ∗ p ≤ .1, ∗∗ p ≤ .05, ∗∗∗ p ≤ .01

Tables 6 and 7 suggest that Rotation supports a shift from coordinating on
DM to coordinating on CM. Rematching does not have an effect on the Farmer’s
desire to bilaterally trade; the estimated coefficients on the dummy Rematching
in Table 6 are insignificant. However, it does have an effect on the Farmer’s probability of holding their own production good, and the coefficient on the dummy
Rematching in Table 7 has a negative and significant value. Overall, this offers
mixed evidence regarding the hypothesis that Rematching alters the Farmer’s
trading behavior.
The results above, have an interesting implication for monetary theory. Start
by noting that the Large treatment increases the size of the group and introduces
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random meetings, relative to the small Baseline economies. In the terminology
of monetary theory, the Large treatment introduces trade frictions because exchange is harder to accomplish than in Baseline.
Monetary theory suggests that in this kind of situation DM trade should become more prevalent. Individuals would try to raise their consumption frequency
by accepting a good that they do not consume but can easily carry and later
exchange for their consumption (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989). In short, uncertain
trade opportunities provide an incentive to expand the set of goods that individuals are willing to acquire beyond those that satisfy their effective demand. In
practice, Results 2-3 collectively give a different view, which we summarize in the
last result.
Result 4 (Trade frictions and the use of media of exchange). Greater
trade frictions due to a larger economy size and random meetings, discouraged the
emergence of a medium of exchange.
Evidence comes from Table 3, Table 5 and Table 6. Table 3 shows that frictions
are associated with a significant increase in travel (dummy Large, middle panel),
suggesting a greater reliance on CM compared to the baseline case. Table 5 shows
that Fishermen travel more frequently to meet Farmers under Large than Baseline. Table 6 reveals that Farmers react to an increase in trade frictions by less
frequently accepting to trade theirs for the Hunter’s production.
Taken at face value, this evidence seems to contradict a basic assertion of
the theory of money. However, the typical monetary model imposes a bilateral
meeting process while excluding the possibility of altering the meeting process,
for example, to synchronized trade in a multilateral meeting. In this case, players
have no other option but to accept goods that are not consumed but are easy to
carry using money that is in order to increase their consumption frequency.
Result 4 suggests that the theory should be expanded to consider endogenous
meeting technologies, without constraining interactions to be bilateral. The experimental evidence indicates that the emergence of media of exchange depends to a
large extent on whether or not players are able to easily control their consumption
patterns by altering the underlying matching process.
32

6

Discussion

At an aggregate level neither decentralized asynchronous exchange, DM, nor centralized synchronous exchange, CM, prevailed. Why don’t we observe a dominant
organization of exchange? A possible reason is that neither trade pattern maximizes the payoff of every player type. By design, some player types (Fishermen)
have a greater benefit from engaging in DM trading compared to CM trading (see
Section 4). It is thus possible that such a misalignment of incentives made coordination on any given trade pattern difficult to attain. An alternative explanation
is that CM trade involves a risky investment for Fishermen, while DM trade does
not. Synchronous exchange in a centralized market requires an upfront investment
for Fishermen in the form of a high transportation cost. This investment is risky
because trade can take place only if all players end up being present at the trading
location (Figure 3), which is not guaranteed. By contrast, CM and DM are both
risky for Hunters, since they travel in each case (albeit with different frequencies).
It is thus possible that such risk pushed Fishermen toward DM trade.
Monetary theory has put forward the notion that the use of media of exchange
naturally emerges as a response to trade frictions due to barter difficulties (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989), specialization (Camera et al., 2003), and the inability to
maintain long-run relationships (Townsend, 1980).
Result 1 lends partial support to this view. On the one hand, the experiment
provides evidence that decentralized bilateral exchange is relatively more frequent
when subjects are specialized and not diversified, as happens in Baseline relative
to Rotating. On the other hand, we do not find evidence that group instability
has a significant effect on trade patterns. In the Rematching treatment subjects
cannot maintain long-run relationships over the course of the session, and yet we
do not observe a significant difference in the modalities of exchange compared to
Baseline.
Why does diversification affect trade patterns but group instability does not?
Diversification in the Rotation treatment allows participants to take turns in
sharing the greater surplus offered by the efficient CM trade pattern. The alter33

nation over specialization types is especially meaningful when groups are fixed
throughout the session, which unlocks reciprocity schemes. In this case, one can
view a session as an indefinite sequence of the travelling games in which endowments are redistributed at random points. According to this view, a subject’s lower
earnings in an early block can be compensated with higher earnings in subsequent
blocks. There is support for this view in the data. Fishermen more frequently
travel with their production good when their roles regularly rotate (Result 2).
Additionally, Farmers more frequently turn down bilateral trades when their roles
regularly rotate (Result 3) in order to motivate others to coordinate on CM exchange, which is more profitable for Farmers. On the other hand, introducing
instability in a group as done in Rematching is likely to weaken reciprocity
schemes over the course of the session. Indeed, interaction in an unstable group
increases coordination problems and may slow down learning, two elements that
are especially important to support DM trade, which requires greater dynamic
coordination. This is a possible explanation of the finding that trade patterns
are not affected in Rematching when compared to Baseline. Another possible reason is that under Rematching subjects may have a stronger incentive to
signal their desire to play their preferred equilibrium. However, the incentives are
not aligned, because Farmers prefer CM, and Fisherman prefer DM. These two
effects may cancel each other out, which is why we do not observe any significant
differences in outcomes (inventories, travel and trade) when groups are stable as
opposed to unstable.
Dynamic coordination problems are also a likely explanation for the prominence of DM trading conventions in small compared to large groups.
The Large treatment prevented repeated interaction in a small group of partners. It more than quadrupled the size of the trading group and imposed a random
meeting process. Both of these elements raised coordination difficulties. Experimental evidence indicates that interaction within a stable and small group of
partners facilitates coordination and the development of social conventions (Camera et al., 2013; Weber, 2006). Result 4 confirms this intuition because large
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groups more frequently coordinated on CM trade, which is based on a cognitively
simpler, time-invariant strategy.
Monetary theorists may express surprise at this result. Monetary theory has
put forward the notion that the use of media of exchange should naturally emerge
as a response to trade frictions due to random matching in large economies (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989). The idea is that with greater difficulties in trading,
individuals will accept goods they do not consume in an attempt to increase their
consumption frequency. And yet, we find that when trading groups are larger and
participants meet at random, then centralized markets more frequently emerge
because Fishermen travelled more frequently (Result 2) and Farmers refused to
trade their production for a good they could transport at low cost but did not
consume (Result 3). Does this result contrast with theoretical assertions by monetary theorists? The answer is in the negative. The contrast is only apparent once
we recognize that in the typical foundations of money model the trade modality
is assumed. For example, in the random matching model of money there can
only be asynchronous bilateral exchange, according to some exogenously specified
random process. In our design, instead, players are free to bypass trade frictions
by organizing their market interactions differently, and exploiting the benefits of
multilateral, synchronous exchange. In this sense the experiment shows that to understand the emergence of monetary systems it is important to amend the theory
of money to endogenize the mode of interaction.
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